ABSTRACT
Strategic considerations joined the technical and technological factors that turned the leading navies away from the Jeune École and back toward the battleship. It became generally accepted that an armored battle fleet provided a better deterrent against attack and could defend home waters reliably regardless of the weather. Furthermore, most countries did not have a rival with a volume of overseas commerce sufficient to justify commerce raiding as a primary strategy. Finally, from the United States, the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan provided battle fleet proponents with historical arguments to support their points of view. From Emperor William II to Theodore Roosevelt, pro-navy political leaders would treat Mahan's works as holy scripture. Unarmored cruisers and torpedo boats remained an important part of all navies, but no longer were considered a potential main striking force. Out of the confusion of 1860–90 there finally emerged a standard design of battleship, what would later be called the “predreadnought.” Masts and yards, still in evidence on the casemate ships of the 1870s, disappeared entirely. In the early 1890s compound armor gave way to nickel–steel plate, perfected by the German firm of Krupp. Increased protection without added weight facilitated a further increase in battleship size, paving the way for the dreadnought design after the turn of the century.
