ABSTRACT
The outbreak of war in the spring of 1967 shocked Israelis to the core, for it came, to speak bluntly, as a bolt from the blue. And it is only because this war was so remarkably successful that no demand was ever made — as was to be the case after the 1973 war - to investigate the politico-military establishment, whose superficial optimism and complacency had led Israelis to believe that war was a remote and unlikely event. That the Israeli leadership was totally relaxed about the security situation in the period just before this war, is well illustrated in the following extract from a report written by Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser in Lyndon Johnson's administration, of his meeting with Israeli Ambassador Abraham Harman on 31 January 1967:
Israeli ambassador Harman came in yesterday ... to share his observations on the mood in Israel. His theme was basically that Israel faces an economically difficult situation over the next three years or so ... he said most Israeli leaders feel the long-term security situation is under control.1
