ABSTRACT

Throughout the post-war era, Austria and Sweden remained outside the EU, because both countries considered membership to be incompatible with their neutral status and a threat to their social democratic achievements of full employment, a generous welfare state and increasing equality in society. Against the background of globalisation, however, Austria and Sweden, like other Western countries, although slightly later, experienced the end of the Fordist accumulation regime and endured dramatic economic recessions at the beginning of the 1980s. Belief in the superiority of the two countries’ economic and political systems was eroded, and they were eventually abandoned, in Austria in 1985-6 and in Sweden approximately five years later, when the ‘third way’ strategy had also failed. In this situation, rather than appearing a threat, the EU, revived around the Internal Market initiative, offered some hope for a fast recovery and help with the necessary restructuring of the apparentiy backward Austrian and Swedish statesociety relations. In addition, the international security system was changing. While this did not push Austria and Sweden towards membership, it ensured that neutrality was a much less severe obstacle to EU membership than during the previous four decades. Gorbachev’s liberal foreign policy and the decline of the Soviet Union in the case of Austria, and the end of the Cold War in the case of Sweden made a redefinition of neutrality and, thus, the formulation of a pro-membership project feasible. While the rough outlines of the story can be told quickly, this does not throw much light upon the actual processes leading first to application and then to membership after a referendum. It does not reveal anything about the main actors involved, the opposition put forward against the EU and the reasons why the pro-membership forces won. To do this, a theoretical lens is required for the analysis.