ABSTRACT
We have argued that believing in right and wrong involves holding that there are judgements on human action that ought to be made by everyone. To many this idea will seem outmoded and extreme. The absolutism which it involves may seem either naive or arrogant: how, it might be asked, can one individual claim to know what it is correct for everyone to do? It may also appear dangerous, for it seems a small step from someone claiming that she knows how everyone ought to act to her imposing her views on others. There are various other factors that may make us suspicious of the absolute nature of moral judgements. Today, most of us are aware of numerous value systems different from our own and, having discounted their claims to correctness, it seems appropriate to be wary about making such claims ourselves. Furthermore, it is not only with other groups that we have conflicts about values; within our society some moral ideals are fairly widely held, but there is still much disagreement. Against this background, the idea of absolute claims may seem more implausible than in the past, for in putting forward her moral views the individual cannot even claim that her values are those of an entire society. If it would be arrogant and misguided for a society to claim that its values were correct, it seems presumption beyond belief for an individual to make this claim. Considerations such as these are part of what lies behind the modern desire for a less absolute conception of morality. Keen to respect the variety of ethical claims,
we may be drawn towards a more modest account of ethics, one which sees it as having a personal and/or social basis. The most direct way of doing this is simply to relativise moral judgements so that correct is taken to mean ‘correct for me’ or ‘correct in my opinion’. It is not at all clear, however, how these two elements can be combined, for once we stress the idea of correctness, universality seems to follow automatically. What would it mean, for example, for someone to say that murder was wrong but restrict her judgement to herself? She would seem to be claiming that it was permissible for anyone else to commit murder but not for her. This would not only be an eccentric position, but ironically it would be just as absolute as any other. An alternative interpretation would be to see the individual’s attempt to relativise her judgement as an explicit recognition that others might disagree. Again, however, this makes little sense. On the one hand, her opponents do not need her permission to disagree, and on the other hand, there is a sense in which she cannot even give it. She can affirm the right of other people to have a position, but she cannot endorse their alternative positions without abandoning her own. If she believes murder is wrong, she must reject the claims of those who say it is permissible. The ‘arrogance’ of claiming that the only correct view about murder is that it is wrong is not altered if the person who makes this claim lamely adds ‘in my opinion’.
