ABSTRACT
I introduced theses of impartiality, neutrality and autonomy (in Chapter 4); but they concerned only inquiry conducted predominantly under the materialist strategies. It is now clear that this involves a serious oversimplification. At least in principle, and to some extent in practice, the objective of science-to gain understanding of phenomena-may (must?) be pursued with a number of different approaches, each deploying its own particular strategies. Where does this leave the view that the sciences are, or ought to be, value free? In view of the argument that no theories can become accepted outside of research conducted under strategies which are adopted in part because of their mutually reinforcing interactions with particular value complexes, does the idea of science as value free retain any sense? Or should it be dismissed simply as the allure of a way of thinking that disguises the role of values (the modern values of control) in the predominant approaches to modern science?
