ABSTRACT
In the first half of the nineteenth century, there had been many separate sciences, little related to one another, which came under the umbrella of natural philosophy. Sometimes some of them had been and were grouped under the heading ‘physics’ (coming from the Greek word for nature):1 but this label might exclude mechanics, and include meteorology and even magic, and corresponds very weakly to our notion of what physics is. The labels given to sciences, and the boundaries drawn between them, are matters of convenience, social constructions rather than discoveries about the world; but, because they are taken seriously, and have definite effects, they can indicate understanding by relevant publics at particular times and places. Careers, circles of friends and colleagues, learned and popular societies, and publications all depend upon how sciences and their frontiers are perceived. Different taxonomies put different disciplines at the top or bottom of the scale in a pecking order; psychology or sociology may be perceived as the apex of science because its subject matter is so difficult, or particle physics because it is so basic. Such a hierarchy was prominent in the writings of Comte, who despite his mathematical training, saw sociology (a name he invented) as the highest science.2
