ABSTRACT
This is a surprising claim, and many have suspected Sextus of bad faith on this score. Are we really to believe that the Sceptic, in spite of the fact that he has suspended judgement (epochē, the technical term for the suspension of judgement, will become of crucial importance) as a result of the equipollence (isostheneia) of the considerations adduced on either side of the issue, and thus has achieved tranquillity or freedom from disturbance (ataraxia: the universal ethical goal of the Hellenistic schools), nevertheless continues to investigate the matter? This looks like a paradigm of pointlessness. I shall argue later (Chapters XVII and XVIII) that it is not, and an understanding of why it is not is essential to forming an accurate picture of just what Sextus’s Pyrrhonism involves. Still, even given that the Sceptic can theoretically justify this claim to be a perpetual investigator, one may doubt whether as a matter of fact such a commitment was acted upon-for Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a practical philosophy, a way of life. These issues form the core of the discussion in the last two chapters of this book. For now, let us simply accept at face value Sextus’s zetetic protestations. The distinctions drawn in 1, the opening sentence of PH, neatly and immediately suggest that one may adopt one of two quite distinct positions, each of which may be described as broadly sceptical.
