ABSTRACT

This economics of science portrays science as an imperfect process with the potential for both astounding success and abysmal failure. Science is mostly a self-corrective process, but nevertheless a potential for failure is always present. Besides the examples of misconduct noted in earlier chapters, the cases of Popper, free market economics, and Friedman’s essay raise a concern for market failure in the scientific marketplace of ideas. A myopic conception of science as a competitive process that inevitably and without question leads to progress and truth needs significant amendment. An economics of science that encompasses scientific progress and also misconduct and market failure in the marketplace of ideas can provide such amendments. Market failure in the marketplace of ideas raises a concern for the organizational and institutional structure of science. If there is significant market failure in the marketplace of ideas and if it

is undesirable for government to intervene and correct market failure in the domain of science, then there must be other organizations, institutions, and processes which contribute to the self-correctiveness of science.