ABSTRACT

The notion that the provision of psychological support to crime victims and to victims involved in traffic accidents constitutes an integral part of the criminal justice mandate is currently broadly adhered to, unlike some 20 years ago (Smith, 1985). Emotional support is mainly offered by individuals lacking extensive psychological expertise, such as police officers and volunteers engaged in victim support organizations (e.g., the National Association of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) in the UK, the Netherlands Victim Support (NVS), the National Organization for Victim Support (NOVA) in the US, and Association Plaidoyer-Victimes (APV) in Canada). However, early studies on the quality of police-based victim support revealed rather disappointing results (Skogan, 1984; Winkel, 1987). Programs proved to be either ineffective or even counterproductive. Similarly, more recent studies on volunteer provided victim support highlight the risk of backlash effects on victims' psychological re-adjustment (Fattah, 1999; Winkel & Renssen, 1998). Many volunteers and professionals, more or less explicitly, tend to foster the impression in clients that victims are helpless, and cannot cope on their own without the assistance of external supporters. Victims are easily labeled with the “Mark of Abel” (Fattah, 1999). In his discussion of potential “nocebo effects” and potential dangers of victim therapy, Fattah (1999, p. 201) suggests that many of the dangers of questionable and potentially harmful practices, such as overzealous therapists implanting false memories of sexual abuse during childhood or practices involving individuals who have adequate social support and do not suffer from specific vulnerability factors in psychological debriefing programs (Bisson & Deahl, 1994), can be traced to the fact that the methods and the techniques used are not based on solid empirical evidence or hard scientific facts. Instead, these practices stem from the popular tendency to pathologize natural symptoms and perfectly normal reactions and to fit these displays under new illness categories. Moreover, analyses done by Winkel and Renssen (1998) reveal a highly prevalent “upward bias” among victim assistance workers. This misperception refers to an incorrect expectation on the part of support workers regarding the direction of victims' social comparison processes: helpers tend to expect victims to engage in upward comparisons, on a comparison-dimension the victim is saying “I'm worse off” than the comparison target, while these victims actually engaged in downward comparison processes, such as “I'm better off”. Three recent studies reported by Winkel, Blaauw, and Wisman (1999) not only underscored the high prevalence of downward comparison processes among crime victims, but also revealed that these victims profit psychologically from engagement in these processes. In other words, downward comparisons were vital in controlling fear of crime responses, and they were associated with more successful adjustment and with lower levels of reported trauma symptoms. Effective victim support in their view entails methods in which “downward signals” emitted by victims are reinforced by the support worker. A lack of sensitivity for such signals, such as an upward bias, may then seriously undermine the therapeutic value of current interventions.