ABSTRACT
It is probably fair to say that Jung’s understanding of images reflected his re-presentational heritage in Cartesian epistemology: we do not see others, for instance, but mental images of others, and we do not see the archetypes but archetypal images. Image is for Jung the stuff of psyche. But especially in his later work, through the notions of esse in anima and anima mundi, Jung came to appreciate the profound sense in which images are not to be located in individual psychology, no matter how “deep” the archeology into “collective” regions of the mind. Nevertheless, as Sipiora argues, it is especially in Hillman’s work that the image is more securely linked to the manner in which a world is presented (not re-presented). However, from the perspective of Heideggerian phenomenology, Hillman’s work is still in need of an ontological ground in that most original occurence of presentation known as Being. The grounding of Hillman in Heidegger is not a one-way journey, however, as Sipiora uses Hillman’s understanding of images to “psychologize” (Hillman’s term) Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Being.
