ABSTRACT
What does the IAEA safeguards regime look like? From its inception in the 1950s the IAEA has carried out inspections of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Agency inspectors visit nuclear facilities in order to verify that governments live up to their commitments to peaceful applications of nuclear material. Verification can take place only on the basis of voluntary agreements with the state in which the inspection is to occur. Thus, the IAEA is not a supranational organization able to impose inspections on any state. International agreements can relate to all or part of the nuclear material in a state. The goal of applying IAEA safeguards is to ensure that the material is not used for military and/or nuclear explosive purposes. Important safeguards measures are nuclear material accountancy, and containment and surveillance (seals; cameras).3 With
the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the system of safeguards underwent expansion. The NPT obliged states without nuclear arms not to manufacture or receive such weapons. They were also bound to allow inspection of their civil nuclear activities by the IAEA. In exchange for their commitment to share nuclear technology with the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) for peaceful purposes, the ‘nuclear haves’ were permitted to keep their arsenals, and were exempted from inspections. Similar obligations binding the NNWS followed from the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, and from bilateral agreements. The five official nuclear states have voluntary safeguard agreements, which cover part of the nuclear installations on their territory. After China’s and France’s accession to the NPT in 1992, only four major states have refused NPTsafeguards. Three of them (India; Pakistan; Israel) are just-beyond threshold.
