ABSTRACT
There are not now, nor were there ever, any specifically moral concepts. Morality is everywhere . . . or nowhere in particular. Our proper admirations, our proper indignations and contempt range widely: they cannot be neatly classified as aesthetic, moral or prudential. Normativity - the directions of ideals, commands and obligations - ranges equally widely. The grounds for our obligations - and our reasons for attending to those grounds - vary widely: the proper answer to the question ‘Ought I . . .?’ cannot be found by turning to a specific set of considerations or to a specific structure of reasoning. Sometimes the answer has the form ‘You’ll betray what is centrally important to you if you don’t’; sometimes it is ‘You’ll be in deep trouble if you don’t’; or ‘You’ll be dangerously irrational if you don’t’. Nor does narrowing the question to ‘What does morality require of me in this circumstance?’ limit the field. The claims of reason (however they may be found!) or those of our fundamental identity-defining ground projects and commitments each present distinctive grounds for determining what morality requires; the pains of exclusion from the human community or those of an ill-formed and ill-spent life each provide distinctive counsels against immorality. None is sufficient, none absolutely necessary; they are not reducible to a more fundamental ground; there is not even a clear taxonomic hierarchy among them.
