ABSTRACT
It has been a commonplace amongst philosophers, for some two hundred years, that it is anthropomorphic to apply such terms as ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ to nature. These terms apply only within human life and not at all to the world which surrounds it. This view has its difficulties, especially since it holds also that there is nothing in human life which is not the product of that surrounding world. It now seems impossible to account for the existence of meaning and purpose. For that reason, materialists seek to eliminate ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ altogether, it being deemed anthropomorphic to apply those terms not simply to nature but even to human beings. Peirce’s view is the exact opposite. Meaning and purpose are real; they are not the product of human activity for there is no activity, recognisable as human, which does not already possess them. Their source lies more deeply in nature which therefore must involve processes akin to those in human life that exhibit meaning and purpose. To assume a gulf between nature and human life leaves human life itself inexplicable; to preserve continuity by eliminating from human life all elements of meaning and purpose is in intellectual terms suicidal. Now the vehicle of meaning and purpose in human life is language. ‘All thought whatsoever’, says Peirce, ‘is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language.’ Consequently the study of language is a study of the mind in its relation to the world and therefore a study of the world itself. It is implicitly metaphysical. For this view, Peirce is often criticised by his commentators. He is accused of attempting to derive conclusions about the world from the study of linguistic or logical forms. But that criticism is based on the very assumption of an absolute gulf between language or logic on the one hand and the world on the other, which it is precisely Peirce’s intention to deny. We shall be enabled to clarify these points if we look more closely at his account of language or theory of the sign.
