ABSTRACT
The contemporary inventory of psychological syndromes is, as we observed in Chapter 1, striking in its breadth and variety. Whatever the (perceived) origin of individual syndromes – mental trauma, physical injury, substance ingestion, stress, hormonal fluctuations, genetic predisposition, psychological or physical addiction – it is hard to ignore the expansion in diagnoses that is under way. What should have brought about such escalation? Have advances in medical and psychological science enabled a more accurate understanding of human behaviour to develop, as the language of most published papers and diagnostic manuals implies (e.g. DSM-IV, 1994)? Might it be that such maladies have been recognised in the past, but the official labels have changed, as Showalter (1997) argues? Perhaps the increase is due to the invention (Lee, forthcoming) or construction (Scott, 1990; Young, 1995) of entirely new illnesses? Has, as Downs (1996) proposes, Western society begun to use psychological logic as the means for determining moral and social responsibility?
