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to be implemented as a precondition for the single market programme. The Commission responded by proposing a package of measures. These would necessitate a significant increase in the budget, a prospect which met with little enthusiasm on the part of richer northern members who would have to pay the bill. The issue was resolved during Germany’s Presidency of the Council in the first part of 1988. In effect, Germany agreed to meet the bulk of the bill in order to secure implementation of the single market. It was a critical moment in Chancellor Kohl’s elevation to the rank of European statesman. It also consolidated his alignment with a re-elected President Mitterrand and ultimately opened up the route which would lead to Maastricht. The central thesis of this book is that external events have always been a critical determinant of the process of integration. However, the declared perspectives of the principal players at the time may not be the best guide to this. So far this chapter has focused entirely on internal Community events, completely ignoring the external context. At one level it seems almost unfair to make the point that whilst the Community was largely absorbed with the single market and with the pre-negotiations which were to lead to the Maastricht Treaty, the external context was entirely and irrevocably changed by collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the USSR and the end of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War. The consequential reunification of Germany meant a physical and geographical enlargement of the Community itself. The collapse of the Communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire were unexpected events. It is easy enough to understand in retrospect why these developments took place, and some will argue that they were inevitable, but at the time of the SEA there was no statesman in Western Europe with any conception that the external context was about to change so rapidly. It is interesting to contrast the prevalen external context at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel
DOI link for to be implemented as a precondition for the single market programme. The Commission responded by proposing a package of measures. These would necessitate a significant increase in the budget, a prospect which met with little enthusiasm on the part of richer northern members who would have to pay the bill. The issue was resolved during Germany’s Presidency of the Council in the first part of 1988. In effect, Germany agreed to meet the bulk of the bill in order to secure implementation of the single market. It was a critical moment in Chancellor Kohl’s elevation to the rank of European statesman. It also consolidated his alignment with a re-elected President Mitterrand and ultimately opened up the route which would lead to Maastricht. The central thesis of this book is that external events have always been a critical determinant of the process of integration. However, the declared perspectives of the principal players at the time may not be the best guide to this. So far this chapter has focused entirely on internal Community events, completely ignoring the external context. At one level it seems almost unfair to make the point that whilst the Community was largely absorbed with the single market and with the pre-negotiations which were to lead to the Maastricht Treaty, the external context was entirely and irrevocably changed by collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the USSR and the end of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War. The consequential reunification of Germany meant a physical and geographical enlargement of the Community itself. The collapse of the Communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire were unexpected events. It is easy enough to understand in retrospect why these developments took place, and some will argue that they were inevitable, but at the time of the SEA there was no statesman in Western Europe with any conception that the external context was about to change so rapidly. It is interesting to contrast the prevalen external context at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel
to be implemented as a precondition for the single market programme. The Commission responded by proposing a package of measures. These would necessitate a significant increase in the budget, a prospect which met with little enthusiasm on the part of richer northern members who would have to pay the bill. The issue was resolved during Germany’s Presidency of the Council in the first part of 1988. In effect, Germany agreed to meet the bulk of the bill in order to secure implementation of the single market. It was a critical moment in Chancellor Kohl’s elevation to the rank of European statesman. It also consolidated his alignment with a re-elected President Mitterrand and ultimately opened up the route which would lead to Maastricht. The central thesis of this book is that external events have always been a critical determinant of the process of integration. However, the declared perspectives of the principal players at the time may not be the best guide to this. So far this chapter has focused entirely on internal Community events, completely ignoring the external context. At one level it seems almost unfair to make the point that whilst the Community was largely absorbed with the single market and with the pre-negotiations which were to lead to the Maastricht Treaty, the external context was entirely and irrevocably changed by collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the dismantling of the USSR and the end of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War. The consequential reunification of Germany meant a physical and geographical enlargement of the Community itself. The collapse of the Communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire were unexpected events. It is easy enough to understand in retrospect why these developments took place, and some will argue that they were inevitable, but at the time of the SEA there was no statesman in Western Europe with any conception that the external context was about to change so rapidly. It is interesting to contrast the prevalen external context at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel
ABSTRACT