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Minister. At first sight it is an interesting example of a reverse linkage between national and European developments. This book has highlighted a number of occasions when the course of European integration was profoundly influenced, even determined, by national political developments. The deposition of Thatcher was an occasion on which European issues apparently impacted decisively on national politics. However, occasion and cause are not always synonymous and the reality is slightly different. European issues were undoubtedly the occasion for the change of Prime Minister. However, the underlying causes lay in domestic politics – particularly the poll tax fiasco – and a fear amongst Conservative back-benchers that the next general election could be lost if changes were not made. There is little evidence that the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major changed British attitudes towards the Community, soon to become the Union. Differences between leading British government ministers remained and splits over European issues in the Conservative party were to deepen, especially after the 1992 elections. Other European leaders now had to deal with a much weaker British Prime Minister – not necessarily an advantage. Although there is little evidence that the changed external context had much impact on the IGCs and the shape of the Treaty on European Union, the same may not necessarily be true for developments immediately post-Maastricht. The ratification process was more difficult than that for any other treaty. A referendum in Denmark rejected the entire Treaty, a situation only reversed by special concessions and opt outs. President Mitterand called a referendum in France, largely in the hope of boosting his own waning popularity, and came within a whisker of losing. In Britain the ratification process in Parliament was delayed by the growing split in the Conservative party re-inforced by a crisis in the European Monetary System. When Britain had finally joined the exchange rate mechanism in 1990, the pound sterling – which had for some time previously been shadowing the mark – was valued at a high rate which simply could not be sustained. Faced with enormous and uncontrollable speculative movements and unwilling to seek an agreed currency revaluation, Britain simply pulled out of the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992. Thereafter with the Conservative party increasingly adopting the line on Europe which had theoretically cost Thatcher her job, ratification of Maastricht was for some time on a knife edge. This chapter is entitled ‘From Commmunity to Union’. An apparent relaunching of the integration process with the single market initiative promoted another of those relatively brief and infrequent waves of what has
DOI link for Minister. At first sight it is an interesting example of a reverse linkage between national and European developments. This book has highlighted a number of occasions when the course of European integration was profoundly influenced, even determined, by national political developments. The deposition of Thatcher was an occasion on which European issues apparently impacted decisively on national politics. However, occasion and cause are not always synonymous and the reality is slightly different. European issues were undoubtedly the occasion for the change of Prime Minister. However, the underlying causes lay in domestic politics – particularly the poll tax fiasco – and a fear amongst Conservative back-benchers that the next general election could be lost if changes were not made. There is little evidence that the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major changed British attitudes towards the Community, soon to become the Union. Differences between leading British government ministers remained and splits over European issues in the Conservative party were to deepen, especially after the 1992 elections. Other European leaders now had to deal with a much weaker British Prime Minister – not necessarily an advantage. Although there is little evidence that the changed external context had much impact on the IGCs and the shape of the Treaty on European Union, the same may not necessarily be true for developments immediately post-Maastricht. The ratification process was more difficult than that for any other treaty. A referendum in Denmark rejected the entire Treaty, a situation only reversed by special concessions and opt outs. President Mitterand called a referendum in France, largely in the hope of boosting his own waning popularity, and came within a whisker of losing. In Britain the ratification process in Parliament was delayed by the growing split in the Conservative party re-inforced by a crisis in the European Monetary System. When Britain had finally joined the exchange rate mechanism in 1990, the pound sterling – which had for some time previously been shadowing the mark – was valued at a high rate which simply could not be sustained. Faced with enormous and uncontrollable speculative movements and unwilling to seek an agreed currency revaluation, Britain simply pulled out of the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992. Thereafter with the Conservative party increasingly adopting the line on Europe which had theoretically cost Thatcher her job, ratification of Maastricht was for some time on a knife edge. This chapter is entitled ‘From Commmunity to Union’. An apparent relaunching of the integration process with the single market initiative promoted another of those relatively brief and infrequent waves of what has
Minister. At first sight it is an interesting example of a reverse linkage between national and European developments. This book has highlighted a number of occasions when the course of European integration was profoundly influenced, even determined, by national political developments. The deposition of Thatcher was an occasion on which European issues apparently impacted decisively on national politics. However, occasion and cause are not always synonymous and the reality is slightly different. European issues were undoubtedly the occasion for the change of Prime Minister. However, the underlying causes lay in domestic politics – particularly the poll tax fiasco – and a fear amongst Conservative back-benchers that the next general election could be lost if changes were not made. There is little evidence that the replacement of Margaret Thatcher by John Major changed British attitudes towards the Community, soon to become the Union. Differences between leading British government ministers remained and splits over European issues in the Conservative party were to deepen, especially after the 1992 elections. Other European leaders now had to deal with a much weaker British Prime Minister – not necessarily an advantage. Although there is little evidence that the changed external context had much impact on the IGCs and the shape of the Treaty on European Union, the same may not necessarily be true for developments immediately post-Maastricht. The ratification process was more difficult than that for any other treaty. A referendum in Denmark rejected the entire Treaty, a situation only reversed by special concessions and opt outs. President Mitterand called a referendum in France, largely in the hope of boosting his own waning popularity, and came within a whisker of losing. In Britain the ratification process in Parliament was delayed by the growing split in the Conservative party re-inforced by a crisis in the European Monetary System. When Britain had finally joined the exchange rate mechanism in 1990, the pound sterling – which had for some time previously been shadowing the mark – was valued at a high rate which simply could not be sustained. Faced with enormous and uncontrollable speculative movements and unwilling to seek an agreed currency revaluation, Britain simply pulled out of the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992. Thereafter with the Conservative party increasingly adopting the line on Europe which had theoretically cost Thatcher her job, ratification of Maastricht was for some time on a knife edge. This chapter is entitled ‘From Commmunity to Union’. An apparent relaunching of the integration process with the single market initiative promoted another of those relatively brief and infrequent waves of what has
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