ABSTRACT
It is more than odd that Perry Anderson, who made the impact of largescale warfare the primary cause of the rise of absolutism in Eastern Europe, did not extend this argument to the western variants. For it is extremely difficult to deny the claim of Roland Mousnier and others that war was probably the major factor in promoting the development of the French state. Even a cursory appraisal of the institutions through which the absolutist regime governed makes this clear. The first embryonic ministries to slowly acquire a degree of coherence under the direction of specific secretaries of state were not surprisingly those of finance, war and foreign affairs. Equally obvious is the direct correlation between the number of offices sold and the intensification of large-scale warfare. It was precisely in 1635, the year of France’s entry into the war against Spain, that the sale of offices reached its highest point with a massive flooding of the market with every sort of financial and judicial office from presidents of parlements to sergeants and clerks in the lesser jurisdictions. Two entirely new bureaux des finances were created. By mid-century there were about 500 principal officers attached to the bureaux des finances, around 5,000 in the elections, sustained by perhaps 4,000 receivers, payers and controllers and an estimated 20,000 within the tax farms.1
