ABSTRACT
There is, as Philip Abrams pointed out, no obvious reason why the transition from feudalism to capitalism should involve a passage through the absolute state.1 French absolutism does, indeed, appear to have very little to do with capitalism. Inasmuch as the French state pursued policies which were of interest to the mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie, this reflected its own perceptions of the threat posed by the Dutch and the English rather than a response to the demands of its own merchants. On the contrary, merchant communities were frequently ambivalent or hostile towards government policies. It was not until 1700 that the resuscitated Council of Commerce gave them any permanent place at the centre of the French state. This late arrival was a fair reflection of the regime’s priorities and of the limited numbers and social weight of merchants and manufacturers of substance. Their position does not appear to have been much improved by Colbert’s interventionist policies, the impact of which was variable and which probably had only a marginal effect on France’s overall economic development. The comparative buoyancy of the commercial sector of France’s economy had much more to do with the power of the Atlantic economy than protectionism. This is brought home by the fact that the lucrative trade in sugar, which had undoubtedly benefited from the watchful eye of Colbert, rapidly became an area of free trade. In fact, the resources and power of the French state were never directed towards the protection and aggrandisement of commercial interests with the same determination as England displayed from the mid-seventeenth century. To the extent that the government bolstered the position of the larger merchants through its dispensation of privilege it also made life more difficult for the retailers and craftsmen who far outnumbered them. Entrepreneurial activity became less important than an ability to manage the system. Guild organisation placed restraints on economic activity and probably impeded technical progress. Anyway, the general attachment to guild organisation was attributable neither to the will of
saw guilds as essential means of protecting their share of an inflexible, possibly shrinking, domestic market. Colbert’s overwhelming concern with the production of high-quality cloth for the export markets did little to overcome this problem; there is evidence to suggest that it may well have compounded it by drawing resources away from the manufacture of cheaper textiles. In England the shift away from the manufacture of heavy broadcloths to lighter products for the domestic market owed little to government intervention.
