ABSTRACT
It is possible that some of our language games are derivatives of phylogenetic territorial behaviour transferred on to the level of symbolic interactions, a level where humans can admirably theorize about and justify what they do. Nozick points out that once the deductive connections are recognized, and we see where a premiss leads, we may either accept the conclusion or else reject one of the premisses we previously accepted.3 But in arguments we customarily look for premisses that the interlocutor could not possibly abandon. It is not then a question of merely pointing out deductive connections among statements but of forcing someone to change his mind, reshape his thinking in accordance with our own. In fact, the underlying assumption which structures most linguistic expressions of our argumentative culture is a latent oppositional metaphor whereby we strive to gain approving allies, extend our epistemic ground, export research models, and obtain intellectual tributes. The problem to be discerned is that not only do we perform according to territorial paradigms but also we commonly believe that it is the way we ‘should’ go about-as if it were a ‘conviction’.4 In Moulton’s view, since we make use of adversarial patterns in
our ways of doing philosophy we also claim that these are the best available and most illuminating procedures.5
