ABSTRACT
In the previous chapter we outlined how causal holism transcends the debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism. We also specified how it distances itself from the economic rhetorician’s reduction of economic models to nonornamental metaphors. In this chapter we propose to further articulate the causal holist methodological framework by re-engaging the methodological writings of Friedman and Kaldor. We focus on these writings for many reasons. Clearly, the coherence of the present narrative forces these upon us: as we have seen Mäki uses Friedman to articulate his version of realism, while Lawson uses Kaldor for his articulation of transcendental realism. Moreover, Friedman’s famous piece from 1953 is a sophisticated methodological defence of neoclassical economics, while Kaldor’s writings consist of a devastating critique of the latter type of economics. By seriously engaging these methodological writings, the novel contribution of causal holism to the contemporary debate in the methodology of economics becomes more apparent. Finally, it should be noted that our focus on Friedman’s 1953 piece in no way takes away from the excellent analysis of Friedman’s contribution furnished by de Marchi and Hirsch which focuses on Friedman’s own practice of economics. This analysis is to be welcomed. Our critique of Friedman’s methodological piece merely complements the latter monumental analysis. Our central purpose is to clarify and further delineate the manner in which causal holism, as a methodological framework, is dissatisfied with Friedman’s methodological defence of neoclassical economics and simultaneously the manner in which it reorientates the general methodological evaluation of neoclassical theory. This reorientation is consolidated by its reinterpretation of Kaldor’s methodological contributions.
