ABSTRACT
J. Fontana and J. Nadal clearly summarized the characteristics of Spain’s politico-economic developments in the decade of the 1960s.
The change of policy which began in 1957 and was consolidated from 1959 onwards took place within the framework of a new, large-scale and long-lasting expansion of international capitalism, caused by the economic integration of large areas (The Treaty of Rome, 1957, creating the Common Market), the convertibility of currencies with the consequent ending of the European Payments Union (at the end of 1958), and the progressive liberalisation of all forms of interchange between countries. In order to survive, the Franco regime had to bring itself to write off twenty years of aggressive nationalism, acute protectionism and arbitrary interventionism; on the other hand, for obvious reasons, it felt unable to abandon the system of a strong executive, of a public order maintained by strong-arm methods, of a reactionary fiscal policy and of a tough wage control. Undoubtedly, the new era was one of a novel economic line within the old political framework. No analysis of the period of growth in the sixties can ignore the contradictions and the limitations inherent in such a situation.
