ABSTRACT
In the context of armed confl ict and widespread violence, two important questions shape political agendas inside and outside the aff ected societies: How can we stop the violence? And how can we prevent its recurrence? The answers to these questions depend on a complex interplay of actors with diverging interests and allies as well as on these actors’ power and capabilities. The Syrian war and the postwar situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are recent showcases of the complexity of peacebuilding. International peacebuilders like the United Nations, the World Bank and bilateral donors have become increasingly engaged in institutional reforms designed to foster the nonviolent management of confl ict and to prevent a renewed outbreak of violence. Institutions may be seen as those rules and procedures that regulate social behaviour and embed confl ict in nonviolent borders (cf. Coser 1956; North 1990). Comprehensive negotiated war terminations and peace accords recommend a set of mechanisms to bring an end to war and establish peace. These include institutional reforms that promote democratization and state building (e.g. interim governments, power sharing, a substantial increase in political participation, and an accountable and democratically controlled security sector). Although the role of institutions is widely recognized, their specifi c features – namely their formal or informal character, their relations to state and society, and their eff ects on societal confl icts and divisions – are highly contested in research as well as in practice.
