ABSTRACT
There is an expectation in models of European integration and policymaking studies that interest groups will be the main actors in the policy process. As early as 1958 Ernst B.Haas argued that when nation states joined supranational bodies the ‘institutional and political logic of supranationalism’ would ‘lead to the defensive grouping of commercial interests (at a supranational level) fearful of no longer being able to lobby effectively at a national level’ (Haas, 1958:318, 323). However, as Grant et al. (1989) noted, the political science literature has concentrated on collective action by business while neglecting the independent activities of large firms. It is therefore important to examine firms both in the European and national groups they join and as ‘own account’ actors. This observation connects with Salisbury’s (1984) important warning about the lack of conceptual precision in the American literature on interest representation. He argued that a distinction between interest groups, and the interests of institutions (e.g. a corporation) was needed if the complex patterns of interest representation in Washington politics was to be explained.
