ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION There is a tendency among practitioners to treat theoretical analysis with a measure of derision; theoreticians tend to aim for theoretical coherence regardless of practical difficulties. The most workable balance, however, lies somewhere in between. Theory untempered by pragmatism is but shallow idealism; pragmatism unguided by theory is incoherent and short-sighted. In many ways the problem of subsidies in international trade suffers from the worst of both worlds. Much analysis is done in the abstract and in the world of pure economic theory; practical negotiations and applications of international trade rules are so politicised and are conducted with such overwhelming cynicism as to mock the very idea that a coherent philosophy underlies the exercise. It probably does not. As Cantin and Lowenfeld observe with respect to the Canada-US FTA and NAFTA,
even reading one chapter of each agreement is enough to make one forget what the agreement was about, as one searches for clues to rules within rules, exceptions to exceptions, and bewildering cross references.1
