ABSTRACT

The European war which broke out in August 1914 was expected to be

a short one. The German Crown prince looked forward to a ‘bright and

jolly war’. No European government had made extensive economic or

military plans for a prolonged struggle – the Russian Ministry of War in

1914 was typical in preparing for a struggle of two to six months. Belief in

the power of the offensive to deliver a rapid knockout blow to the enemy

was strong, though developments in military technology since 1871 should

have suggested otherwise. Furthermore, it was assumed that the economic

consequences of a lengthy conflict would be so ruinous that European

countries would be brought to their knees by financial chaos within

months. Sir Edward Grey, in July 1914, had speculated that a European

war involving Austria, France, Russia and Germany ‘must involve the

expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such interference with trade,

that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of

European credit and industry’. In declaring war against each other in 1914

the European great powers envisaged a series of short, sharp, military

encounters, to be followed presumably by a general conference of the

belligerents, which would confirm the military results by a political and

diplomatic settlement. The confident British expectation that its

expeditionary forces would be home by Christmas was echoed in the

other capitals of Europe.