ABSTRACT
The current debate is dominated by a concern to come to grips with this particularly broad and principled version of the problem of epistemic limits. In the hands of critics of the New Archaeology, on the one hand, it is the basis for denying that anything of the preoccupation with scientific objectivity and generality can be salvaged as a regulative ideal appropriate to archaeology (see Miller 1982, Hodder 1982a). Where, on the other hand, the ‘contextual’ nature of factual claims has been recognized even by such a visible proponent of the New Archaeology as Binford, it has been the occasion for renewed efforts to articulate and defend objectivist principles (for example, Binford 1982). In this chapter I examine the process by which the problem of limits has re-emerged, focusing on Binford’s response to it, particularly as articulated in debate with contextualists like Hodder, whom he accuses of ‘paradigmatic posturing’. Despite vehement opposition, Binford and his opponents both engage elements distinctive of the positions that they oppose at strategic points in their argument. This is indicative of significant limitations in both positions, and I conclude that neither is tenable in pure form. In a more constructive vein, several clear guidelines emerge for articulating a position
that comprehends the valid core of objectivist and contextualist insights and suggests a new strategy for addressing the questions about epistemic limits that are central to post-positivist archaeology.
