ABSTRACT
The preceding chapters constitute a panoramic survey of Kant’s moral theory and Kierkegaard’s idea of ethics as quest for selfhood. As mentioned in the introduction, the objective of the present work is not to establish any parallel between the two approaches to moral discourse, not only because it is philosophically impossible to do so but also because it is not desirable. However, philosophers of diverse hues have attempted to establish some kind of convergence between the two, and it is certainly not undesirable to apprise some of them. MacIntyre (1984: 77) claims that Kierkegaard is continuing the Enlightenment project set forward by Kant. R. M. Green (1992: 95-98) notes that there are several points of contact between Kantianism and Either/Or of Kierkegaard. According to him, we can trace Kierkegaardian philosophy back to Kant. Kierkegaard takes precisely the Kantian formulation of free, self-active and self-productive praxis as opposed to objective knowledge as such, for the point of departure from which he constructs his most highly developed concepts (Mehl 2001: 7). Knappe (2004) also identifies Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical with that of Kant. Here we explore the dialogical possibility between the two, and while doing so, we shall undertake to have a cursory view from Nietzschean challenge to morality, which is one end of the spectrum, to the more refined approach of Bhagavad-Gita, which is obviously the other end. Though the basic objective of this book is not to establish any parallel between Kant and Kierkegaard, the Kierkegaardian departure from Kant is not without paying homage to his able predecessor.
