ABSTRACT
In recent years, philosophers have come to realize that the relationship between sciences and values raises questions which are both important and not readily answered. It is true that the major figures in that tradition known as ‘logical empiricism’ appreciated that science always exceeds its empirical grasp and that it is necessary for scientists to be guided and constrained by so-called ‘epistemic values’, these being values (in the words of one supporter) ‘presumed to promote the truth-like character of science, its character as the most secure knowledge available to us of the world we seek to understand’ (McMullin 1983: 18). However, these values – such things as internal and external consistency, simplicity, predictive accuracy and fertility, unificatory power (consilience) -were considered special. Inasmuch as they could not be reduced to basic principles of logic – and there were attempts to do this -they were still thought of, in some sense, as beyond the vagaries of human emotion. Their importance was not a function of the individual's personal inclinations, nor of those of the group, whether this group be understood as a closely knit band of researchers or even up to a complete society.
