ABSTRACT
A feature of successful computer chess programs is that they combine powerful methods for calculation with weak procedures for evaluating their outcomes. The same might be said of standard costbenefit analysis: a sophisticated mathematical analysis is combined with crude measures of value. The unit of value is human preference satisfaction, measured by monetary units in actual or hypothetical markets. The object is to refine the monetary instruments of measurement so that all preferences are included, and to apply a principle for the aggregation of preferences thus measured. Public policy is to be based on the aggregation of preferences. In the next four chapters I argue that this approach to public policy fails to provide the basis for rational and ethically defensible environmental policies. The present chapter examines problems concerning the constituency of environmental policy-who counts in policy decisions. I argue that while cost-benefit analysis is able to incorporate the intrinsic value of nature and the preferences of future generations and non-human beings-criticism to the contrary being unfounded-it fails to give them proper weight. In the following chapters I argue that treatment of policy decisions purely as a process of preference aggregation is misconceived.
