ABSTRACT
Evolutionary approaches to human behavior have generated a wide spectrum of testable hypotheses regarding how the mind works and why we possess our species-typical psychological capabilities (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Kenrick & Luce, 2003; Pinker, 1997). Progress in illuminating various domains of human psychology has occurred, in part, by considering the kinds of adaptive problems that our ancestors faced over our species' evolutionary history. An adaptive problem is a problem posed by long-enduring selection pressures (i.e., statistically recurring features of the social, ecological, biological, or physical world) whose successful solution affected the probability of survival and reproduction, however distally (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Examples of adaptive problems include avoiding inbreeding, directing resources toward close genetic relatives, detecting cheaters, avoiding predators, avoiding substances associated with disease-causing agents, selecting food, and forming friendships. In general, an analysis of the kinds of adaptive problems our species faced can provide a sturdy guide-rail for investigating the nature of our evolved cognitive programs. While this approach has generated a suite of predictions across a number of domains, one domain in particular has received a lion's share of attention: mate selection. This chapter reviews the kinds of adaptive problems that our species faced regarding mate selection and then proposes a model of the underlying evolved cognitive programs hypothesized to govern mate choice.
