ABSTRACT
Now such an interpretation is far harder to justify textually than the naïve view previously discussed. (I take it that Hintikka’s claims of textual support have adequately been refuted by Frankfurt, Kenny and others.34) But it is also no more immune to philosophical objections than the other interpretation. One problem is that the performative interpretation fails to elucidate the central point: the connection between thinking something or entertaining a thought, and becoming convinced of one’s own existence. And if one attempts to remedy this problem he may find that the performative interpretation is no longer standing on its own legs; elements of the other accounts of the cogito reasoning tend to reappear with all their difficulties. Thus, as Fred Feldman has pointed out, one might try to explain Descartes’s inability to think ‘I do not exist’ without becoming convinced of his existence, by supposing he holds the belief, If I think, I exist. But then we have reintroduced the naïve interpretation.35
