ABSTRACT
The sceptical philosophers of Hellenistic Greece held that no one at all could know anything at all; and with commendable consistency they proceeded to deny that they themselves knew even that distressing fact. Their splendid doctrine, or antidoctrine, had, they believed, been adumbrated in the epistemological reflexions of the early Presocratics; for although scepticism had not flourished until the late fifth century, Parmenides’ predecessors had reflected, at least casually, on epistemological matters, and some of them had emitted pronouncements of a sceptical tone. And that, after all, is hardly surprising: the first philosophers had propounded theories of unprecedented scope and presumption. Their utterances must have aroused wonder and amazement; and wonder, as Aristotle observes, is the father of thought. Having wondered that the Milesians knew so much, men might wonder how they knew so much; and having wondered how, it was but a short step to wondering whether they knew quite everything that they professed:
all ignorance toboggans into know
and trudges up to ignorance again.
