ABSTRACT

Probably the most important division in moral philosophy is between consequentialists who believe that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by its contribution to an ideal end state such as the greatest happiness of the greatest number and deontologists who deny that this is so, at least in cases where the action in question would involve the violation of the rights of an individual or individuals. One of the few amusing aspects of the usually grim topic of terrorism is the way in which consequentialists such as R.M.Hare and Kai Nielsen seek to dissociate themselves from terrorism, treating it ever so gingerly as though fearful it might explode in their hands doing great harm to whatever variety of consequentialism they espouse.1 Yet it seems to me plain enough that if there were good reasons for believing that terrorism would contribute to bringing about some ideal end state, then the consequentialist would be hard pressed to reject it as a morally legitimate means to that ideal end state. What then is wrong with terrorism if it cannot be condemned on consequentialist grounds? The deontologist’s case against terrorism can be stated fairly simply: terrorism involves the violation of the rights of persons who may be killed or harmed; even if no one is actually killed or harmed by the terrorist, there is the threat of harm, and threats are a species of coercion, making people behave in ways that they would not otherwise choose; moreover, the persons who are, or maybe, the victims of terrorism are frequently not those whose conduct the terrorist wishes to affect.