ABSTRACT
Aspects of accidents with relatively slight consequences from power systems were outlined in the last chapter. In this chapter, more serious accidents are reviewed, including extensive damage to equipment and perhaps injury to large numbers of people, both operators and the general public. Because of the inherent infrequency of large-scale accidents, examples from worldwide occurrences have been recounted below. However, as a compromise between surveying a lengthy timescale to increase numbers of events and including only events relevant to modern practices, cases before the Second World War are excluded. This is also convenient because the use of nuclear power began postwar, since when it has generated roughly 100 GW(E)yrs of electricity in the UK, several hundred GW(E)yrs in the western world and around 1,000 GW(E)yrs worldwide. Deliberate sabotage will be omitted, partly because measures to counteract terrorism are not public knowledge. It suffices to say that as yet no power plant has been subject to a serious terrorist attack. Inherently, the thick concrete radiation shielding round the more radioactive areas of a nuclear plant provides considerable protection against explosives. Further, there are clearly more ‘worthwhile’, and easier, targets. Excellent discussions on terrorist attack and non-proliferation of atomic weapons are given by Cohen (1983) and Fremlin (1985), and on the general safety principles of nuclear operations by Franklin and Marsham in Foley (1978). In addition to reviewing past experience with nuclear plant, the nature of future nuclear accidents is deemed sufficiently important to merit a separate section for discussion.
