ABSTRACT
Games in which the players’ preferences among the outcomes are neither identical, as they are in pure coordination games, nor diametrically opposed, as they are in zero-sum or constant-sum games, are called mixed-motive games. This term highlights the complex strategic properties that motivate the players partly to cooperate and partly to compete with one another. A player in a mixed-motive game has to contend with an intrapersonal, psychological conflict arising from this clash of motives in addition to the interpersonal conflict of the game. At an abstract level, a mixed-motive game can be distinguished from a zero-sum or constant-sum game by the fact that the sum of the payoffs differs from one outcome to another; it is not the case that what one player gains the other(s) must necessarily lose. Mixed-motive games are therefore sometimes called variable-sum or non-zero-sum games, but this can lead to misunderstandings because coordination games are also generally variable-sum.
