ABSTRACT
The Yahya era was one of high drama and fast moving events that revealed the hollowness of Pakistani political life and the bankruptcy of its political and military establishments. Though short in duration, the Yahya era was a major turning point in Pakistani foreign and military affairs and in its internal affairs. The major event was the break-up of Pakistan and the separation of East Pakistan which became a newly independent state. This was the first time since 1945 that a new state had come into being as a result of internal revolt and external intervention. Secondly, this era saw the militarization on a national scale of the festering economic, political and cultural conflict between the Punjab-dominated West Pakistan and the poor but politically conscious and larger grouping of Bengalis in East Pakistan. Third, the era saw the emergence on a national scale of the Bhutto-PPP factor in West Pakistan-East Pakistan politics. This contrasted with the induction of Bhutto into the Ayub Cabinet when Bhutto lacked a mass following and his subsequent eclipse from the inner circle of power during 1966-71. The creation of political space or room for manoeuvre for Bhutto and Bhuttoism was a side effect of the Yahya era. Fourth, this period will be remembered because it showed to Pakistani public opinion and to the rest of the world that despite its modern arms and privileges and much advertised martial tradition, the Pakistani Army could not win a war in the subcontinent; instead, the Army was an agency of internal repression rather than of national security. Fifth, this era revealed the existence of a Bhutto-Yahya-Pakistani Army coalition at work. Here personal and institutional interests of Bhutto-PPP and YahyaArmy had priority over the national interest to keep the two wings of Pakistan together. Inter-elite coalition politics drove the Bhutto-Yahya-Army combination against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Bengalis; it led to reliance on military methods to solve a major political problem. The lesson is that whenever such a combination gains ground it is not likely to succeed. Sixth, this era revealed how in 1970, as in 1958, the fear of majority rule motivated the military and political elites in West Pakistan to avoid modern democracy. In one way the Yahya era was progressive. Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan pre-empted elections by their coup. In contrast Yahya Khan promised national elections; and he held them. But then, as a result of internal circumstances and the interests of the key players in West Pakistan, he avoided implementing the results of the elections. Seventh, the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan revealed the Pakistani Army’s willingness to
engage in genocide against its own people; here racial motives1 were in play and the common bond of Muslim brotherhood seemed unimportant. The crisis revealed that ethnicity rather than religion was the driving element that had shaped the big divide between West and East Pakistanis since the mid-1950s. The 1971 events created a crisis in Pakistan’s dominant Islamic ideology which had originally stressed the central place of religion in political/state affairs. Eighth, the attitudes and actions of the Bhutto-YahyaArmy coalition revealed a contempt for the results of the 1970 elections which gave more seats in the National Assembly to the Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This revealed a contempt for the principles of power-sharing, political compromise and compensation for the other side. Here separation of East Pakistan was preferable to power sharing. Ninth, this was the first time in Pakistan’s political history that mass politics had achieved momentous results. They shaped the nation’s destiny which the Pakistani Army could not control despite its full use of repressive means in East Pakistan. Urban militancy had been a factor in Ayub’s downfall (1969-70). But in Ayub’s case the Pakistani Army would not use force to control the opposition to Ayub. In the 1971 encounter between the Army and the Bengali mass movement, the Army failed despite its willingness and ability to use force on a large scale. It lacked a strategy to either divide and rule or to repress successfully. Tenth, the Yahya era demonstrated how three forces were at play. These were the armed forces, Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman. In this triangular contest there were two sets of winners. In East Pakistan affairs, Mujib and India made the winning coalition; in West Pakistan affairs, Bhutto was the winner. Finally, Yahya’s actions revealed ambivalence (like Ayub Khan’s in 1968-9). Yahya Khan rejected Ayub Khan’s ‘basic democrat’ approach and he sought instead national elections; here he appeared to want a political solution for a political problem. But then, as the events during March-December 1971 developed, he went for a military solution to a political problem. The implication is that generals are not necessarily clear-headed thinkers in political crises.
