ABSTRACT
Thus far my study indicates the existence of two important patterns in Pakistan’s political affairs.
First, with a small and fragile state structure, successive Pakistani governments have sought to develop external opportunties to project a forceful military and diplomatic stance so as to avoid a preoccupation with internal problems, and to avoid a civil war. These external opportunities usually involved a focus on foreign aid, Kashmir’s and Afghanistan’s liberation, East Pakistani markets, and Middle Eastern monies. Having big ambitions and a narrow base of power and legitimacy in Pakistani politics and society, to survive and to expand their power position the Pakistani elites have inevitably had to develop external opportunities. Here external power projection and internal aggrandizement are linked in the attitudes and behaviour of Pakistani elites. The premise behind this view is that Pakistan is too small for the ambitions of its military and bureaucratic elites; hence they have continually sought external opportunities for their advancement. The search for foreign opportunities explains their preoccupation with externally oriented diplomatic, military and economic affairs. Whenever attractive foreign opportunities emerge, winning coalitions among Pakistani elites also emerge. They take over the pursuit of these opportunities. They circumvent the quest for internal reform. They structure internal political and constitutional arrangements to suit the interests of the ruling elite. In these circumstances the danger of civil war in Pakistan is managed. The winning coalitions result in an unstable balance of power in Pakistan, and a manageable level of instability. Here external opportunities are safety valves in Pakistani politics. They are buffers which divert and absorb Pakistani energies in the absence of orderly constitutional ways to transfer and to share political power.
