ABSTRACT
This concluding chapter reiterates that by taking a bottom-up approach to identify the building blocks of a non-democratic Belarus, a suitable overarching framework can be constructed that takes the form of adaptive authoritarianism. This draws on existing academic debates but is not constrained by any one particular model. Each of the main components of adaptive authoritarianism exists on a continuum. Neopatrimonialism can increase or decrease both the degree of patrimonialism and the amount of rational–legal bureaucratic norms in the system. Electoral authoritarianism can become more competitive or more hegemonic. State–society relations and managed pluralism can be opened up or closed down. Coercive capacity can be low-intensity or high-intensity. Lukashenka’s regime has become adept at taking full advantage of the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Expedient and opportunistic changes in emphasis on any one of the component elements of adaptive authoritarianism can be introduced, but they can also be reversed if deemed necessary. To date this has usually succeeded in bolstering the incumbent authorities and undermining any opposition challenges, but the chapter underlines that the regime is not invulnerable. There could foreseeably come a time when the authorities’ room for manoeuvre and ability to adapt becomes too constrained.
