ABSTRACT
Four-dimensionalism comes in a number of varieties. At one time four-dimensionalism was equated with the view that physical objects are long events or processes, and that the temporal parts of such objects are themselves shorter events. Here we will not be concerned with that variety of four-dimensionalism. Instead, we will be focusing on two types of four-dimensionalism. According to the first, notably defended by David Lewis, the temporal parts of perduring objects are ordinary objects. 1 For example, the temporal part of a chair will be a shorter-lived chair. According to the second, championed by Katherine Hawley and Ted Sider, ordinary objects are only the short-lived objects that on the first view are the temporal parts of the longer-lived ones. 2 Initially, we will be looking at the solutions to the puzzle cases offered by Lewis’ version of perdurantism. Later, we will see whether the Hawley-Sider view enjoys any advantage over Lewis’ view in its treatment of the puzzle cases. Aside from its handling of the puzzle cases we will also be examining arguments for and against four-dimensionalism.
