ABSTRACT

In surveying a recent debate on toleration, I have been struck by two major divergences. 1 First, some seek a morally neutral description, whilst others treat toleration as a moral ideal. Second, some see it as needing strongjustification and justifiable only as the lesser of two evils, whereas for others it is either intrinsically good itself or else inseparable from something that is. Clearly, these are deep disagreements. I do not expect to resolve them. My aim is to examine the familiar ideal of toleration which is widely acknowledged in our society, however partially it is realized in practice, and by spelling out its assumptions and implications to offer a fuller account. Simultaneously I defend the thesis that though there are two distinct sides to toleration, they are necessarily connected-there are not 'two concepts of toleration'. It is important to be explicit about this because my analysis of toleration produces precisely the ingredients from which one is tempted to construct a divide between negative and positive concepts of toleration to parallel the division between negative and positive concepts of freedom. I think that the distinction between negative and positive freedoms is mistaken, distorts especially the understanding of positive freedom, and misdirects the search for the true unity of freedom: but I do not wish to argue that now. I do wish to argue, however, that there are not two concepts of toleration. I contend that toleration, understood as a moral ideal, has both a negative side, much discussed, and a positive side, far

less discussed-and that its full moral force is grasped only when the two sides are taken together.