ABSTRACT
In the light of this distinction,2 which took so long to develop, between what is natural and what is normative, we can become clearer about what constitutes a human society. Men, of course, like the rest of Nature, have certain natural ways of behaving. Psychological theories about universal, unalterable and, perhaps innate, tendencies (e.g. doctrines of human instincts) are attempts to sketch what these ways of behaving are. But imposed on these tendencies and providing the social conditions under which they operate are all kinds of normative rules which introduce order of a different kind. This order can only persist if it does not violate the unalterable properties of human nature. Indeed a frequent criticism of revolutionary reforms is that they take no account of human nature. What we call a human society is a number of individuals bound together by such an order of normative rules. They behave predictably in relations to one another because of this normative system. These rules define the rights and duties which they have towards one another, the ends which they may pursue, and the ways in which it is legitimate to pursue them.*
Men, then, are rule-following animals; they perform predictably in relation to one another and form what is called a social system to a large extent because they accept systems of rules which are variable and alterable by human decision. Indeed we cannot really bring out what we mean by a human action without recourse to standards laying down what are accepted as ends and what are efficient and socially appropriate * For fuller discussion of various types of social whole, see Ch. II.
