ABSTRACT
When we speak of 'morality' we can be using the term in a very general way to speak of a system of rules that are not legal rules but which nevertheless have a widespread application in our conduct. Indeed, some moral philosophers speak of 'customary morality'. Or we can be using the term in a more specific sense to indicate that these rules are not merely customs but rules which have had certain special criteria applied to them. In this second and more specific sense of 'moral' we would not say that a child was a moral being who simply did what he was told without thinking about the tightness of the general principle implicit in his behaviour. The Swiss psychologist, Piaget, maintained that children as a matter of fact remain in this 'transcendental' stage for some time.1 They never question the Tightness or wrongness of rules like 'Thou shall not steal' any more than they question the rules of games like marbles. Of course, they may follow their inclinations or their selfish interests, just as people under an authoritarian Catholic regime often followed their inclinations rather than the authoritative commands of the Church. But they do not challenge the Tightness or wrongness of the rules. Standards are regarded as authoritatively ordained by some external agency. It is only later, at about the age of seven or eight, that they begin to see that rules of games and rules of social life have some point to them and that they can therefore be changed by common consent if they no longer have any point. In this way, if Piaget is right, the development of a child in an open society mirrors the development of man's consciousness from the authoritative ties of a traditional society.
