ABSTRACT
ASSUMING that the objections to interpreting causation as de facto uniformity are valid, what is the alternative? Following the his torical lead of the Leibniz-Wolff approach we might ask if the causal relation was essentially a logical one, such that a cause entails its effect in the same sort of way that the premisses of a syllogism entail the conclusion. This has in fact been advocated by Ewing,1 who holds that no inference would be possible from cause to effect unless there were a logical relation between them. His case consists not so much of a positive argument for his view as of an attempt to dispel the difficulties that may be ascribed to it. Thus we find it hard to see an a priori connexion between any given cause and its effect; but he thinks that there may for all that be such a connexion, which is as difficult for us now to see as it was for mathematicians some three thousand years ago to see the necessary relations that hold between properties of triangles. And he holds that there may be some a priori intuition enabling us to see such relations, though not in the physical sphere, at least in the realm of the mind:
It seems to me that we can see and to some extent really understand why an insult should tend to give rise to anger, why love should lead to grief if the object of one's love die or prove untrustworthy, why a success should give pleasure, why the anticipation of physical pain should arouse fear.2
