ABSTRACT
In Indonesia, non-governmental 'specialists in violence' described by Tilly have been a ubiquitous and conspicuous figure throughout both recent and more distant history. This chapter develops a general framework to think with, or against, in relation to the empirical cases, engaging theoretical frameworks provided by Weber, Tilly, Migdal and Schulte-Bockholt. It argues that the protection racket and its extension in the protection racket regime are useful for understanding the dynamics of informal violence and coercive authority in New Order and post-New Order Indonesia. Frederic Lane has described governments as violence-controlling enterprises that produce and sell the commodity of 'protection'. The chapter identifies and highlights some of patterns of relationships and connections between violent entrepreneurs and political power, and particular conditions in which they arose to paraphrase a 'genealogy of rackets'. As Barker states, preman were a 'necessary component in the maintenance of state power and the collection of taxes', suggesting that preman activity generally increased during times of economic prosperity.
