ABSTRACT

The Berlin talks led to the February 2007 agreement and seemed to portend an end to the nuclear issue based on a freeze of the existing nuclear program, and a promise to dismantle all nuclear facilities in return for energy, economic aid, security guarantees, and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the US and Japan. The agreement was similar to the Agreed Framework, which the Bush Administration had severely criticized, the essence of which was a freeze and the later surrender of the nuclear weapons program. Any agreement between the US and the North could only be a variation of the earlier Agreed Framework since other possibilities were closed off by the North’s opposition. At no other time was there greater optimism that the end was in sight. Nonetheless, subsequent negotiations would revive the same issues that were raised earlier in relation to verification, inspection and their scheduling with the benefits that the North was supposed to receive, which deflated the high hopes that had been raised earlier. Though it was prepared to freeze the existing program the North would not include in the agreement its stock of plutonium or its HEU program, and it refused to accept standard verification procedures which it regarded as intrusive. Verification was the critical issue which prevented final agreement. The result was eventual deadlock and the Six Party Talks met for the last time in December 2008 leaving the nuclear issue hanging. Despite its promises the North was not prepared to surrender its nuclear program entirely and created difficulties when the Americans insisted that it follow up on their agreement.