ABSTRACT
Understanding the psychology of power in North Korea is important to explain why the North’s behavior deviated so often from what the other parties in the talks had expected of it. It was often assumed that the North could bargain away its nuclear program for economic aid, and that it would then reform itself and become integrated with the economies of Northeast Asia in a way which would remove the problem of its existence. Those that made such judgments had little understanding of the dynamics of a system that was so different from their own, and simply projected their own reasonable and wellmeaning expectations onto a regime that operated on different, if not perverse principles. The final round of the Six Party Talks ended in December 2008 with few prospects for their revival in the near future. The North was no longer interested in them and could let them lapse quietly. After his stroke in September 2008 Kim Jong-il moved to strengthen his dynastic hold over power by having his third son Kim Jong-un recognized as successor by the military. Critical for the succession was the demonstration of the dynasty’s power to the outside world to boost the new and inexperienced leader’s credibility before the military and security apparatus which ruled the country. Regime survival demanded the reaffirmation of the founding myths of the Kim dynasty and continual demonstrations of power since there were no other sources of legitimacy. Near economic collapse and the desperate plight of the people propelled the regime not to open up to the world as expected by well meaning foreign observers, but to stage another round of ballistic missile launchings and a second nuclear test in 2009. The dynamics of regime survival dictated major provocations against the South which shattered any hope that the parties had for a renewal of the Six Party Talks.
