Introduction

This is a study of bargaining and negotiation, though it does examine other issues related to the security of the Korean Peninsula. It analyzes the conduct of negotiations with North Korea and shows how the process of negotiation shapes the outcome. The conceptual literature on negotiation has been a useful starting point for this study and in particular I. William Zartman’s concept of the structure of negotiation. Zartman observed that negotiations do not just reflect the distribution of power between the parties but how they relate to each other over issues that concern them. No matter which states are involved and despite their best intentions, once started, negotiations may go in unforeseen and surprising directions. As one diplomat with considerable experience ruefully noted, negotiations become like an “animal” with a life of its own. It is as though a living being is created which may be tame and compliant or violent and uncontrollable, raising demands of its own and constantly requiring attention. No doubt, this does not happen in every situation, as most negotiations, those that deal with functional and household issues between states, proceed with bureaucratic regularity and reach expected conclusions. Those negotiations that deal with critical security issues and involve antagonistic states with opposing positions are a different story. In these cases the act of coming together in negotiations creates a structure which is defined in terms of the interaction between the parties and the positions they assume. A superpower like the US would normally adopt a dominant position defining the agenda and expecting the result to conform to its interests. Some parties may be supportive as they join the dominant player, others may some become openly confrontational, while others may feign cooperation but actually work to a very different agenda. The interaction between them then shapes the negotiations as positions are expressed and then reformulated according to feedback received in an ongoing process of mutual adjustment. In some situations the interaction may result in a satisfactory convergence and agreement. In other cases, however, interaction may intensify the suspicion and mutual antipathy resulting in a polarization of positions and deadlock. This study focuses on the Six Party Talks which were an attempt by the US,

China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to negotiate the termination of North

Korea’s nuclear program. They began in August 2003 and were last held in December 2008, when North Korea withdrew. They were called into being because the Bush Administration refused to negotiate directly with North Korea over its nuclear program in the way the Clinton Administration did before it. The Bush Administration expected the other parties in the talks to join it in pressing the North to surrender the nuclear program. Very high expectations were aroused by the talks which polarized opinion, not only in the US but in South Korea as well, and deteriorated into partisan politics. Critics chastised the neoconservatives of the Bush Administration for resorting to an aggressive posture that, they argued, undermined the Six Party Talks and compelled the North to develop nuclear weapons in response to the fear of an American attack. As they saw it, the way forward was to engage North Korea in dialogue. In their view the North had shown a willingness to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework which terminated the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94 and it was likely to respond to a similar effort at dialogue. It was obvious to them that the Bush Administration was to blame and they thought that if engagement were given a chance, the situation would be resolved. Yet others thought that North Korea was ruled by reasonable men who were led astray by the exigencies of their condition and the American threat. It seemed clear to them that if North Korea were offered assurances that the US would not attack it, as well as economic aid to boost its weakened economy, it would surrender its nuclear weapons program. However, supporters of the Bush Administration’s approach to North Korea regarded it as a pariah state and it seemed obvious to them that the North was bent on obtaining nuclear weapons whatever the cost. As they saw it the North would hardly respond to any incentives that the US could offer, and what was required were disincentives and punitive measures since the regime would understand nothing else. In South Korea a similar polarization was noted given the extensive

expectations attached to the Six Party Talks by supporters of the Roh Moo Hyun Administration, which was in office from 2003-9. This Administration raised great hopes amongst its supporters that brotherly relations could be established with the North, which would spill over into the negotiations over the nuclear program and induce the North to surrender it. The view was that South Korea could tame the North through economic engagement and the establishment of regular government and family interaction, and that a process of gradual change would set in which would bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification. They pinned their hopes on an exhilarating and breathtaking leap into the establishment of a “peace regime” in Northeast Asia that would engage all the major players and finally remove tensions and conflicts. Rather than immediately dealing with the nuclear issue, they called for a “peace regime” which would establish the conditions for the North’s nuclear disarmament and the removal of all the other problems on the Korean Peninsula. The supporters of the Grand National Party, now the Saenuri party, were not persuaded by what they regarded as delusion and saw the North as a continuing threat. They noted that every attempt to come

closer to the North resulted in a provocative incident as the regime saw the South as a threat to its legitimacy. They also pointed out that the “peace regime” espoused by the proponents of engagement would undermine the alliance with the US, which they regarded as the foundation of the South’s security. Much has been written on the negotiations with North Korea from the

perspective of these polemical debates. In the desire to appeal to their audience, assumptions were taken for granted like universal truths that all would accept, and the implications of their positions were not for the most part analyzed. Those who called for engagement did not follow through and identify how it could resolve the issue of the North’s nuclear program. The literature on the North from South Korean sources reflects the views of a generation of scholars which has been influenced by the hope and expectation of “peace regime” formation, but what this meant in practical terms was left vague. Some proponents of engagement called for dialogue and discussion as though that was enough, others demanded that various incentives be offered to North Korea to obtain its compliance. While the general notion was appealing, the issues it stimulated never settled. What incentives could be offered and what price would the North demand to surrender the nuclear program? How were the incentives to be related to the disablement of the nuclear program? Which would come first, the incentives or the termination of the nuclear program? How would the North respond to the incentives and was it really interested? Those in the US who called for isolation and expected the North Korean regime to collapse never really examined the impact of their approach upon the regime and its supporters. They had difficulty understanding the extent to which the US was dependent upon other powers, China in particular, to denuclearize North Korea, and could not command them to do its bidding over North Korea. They failed to realize how much the regime was supported by China and that it could survive at low levels of economic activity for some time. They could not appreciate until much later that isolation allowed the regime to develop its nuclear weapons program, and the threat of American attack worked to strengthen it in the way that external threat solidifies oppressive regimes. The polemics that surrounded the negotiations with North Korea stimu-

lated untested and unfulfilled hopes, derived from expectations that were for the most part unrealistic at the outset. Some have argued that if the US had done things differently, if the right concessions had been given to the North, if the Bush Administration could understand what the North Koreans really wanted, things would have been different. Others have argued that if there had been an international coalition against, if China had cooperated with the US and enforced sanctions, US efforts would have been suitably rewarded and so on. Despite everything North Korea went on to develop its nuclear program and conducted two nuclear tests, in October 2006 and May 2009. This book will not deal with lost opportunities as perceived by any of the advocates of the above views and is intended to be an analysis of the Six Party Talks in terms of their role, function and contribution to the security of the

Korean Peninsula. It is written from a non partisan perspective, one that is disentangled from any of the partisan positions that have been adopted over the subject of North Korea, both in the US and South Korea. The author’s approach is to match the facts with the interpretations that were current at the time, to identify what governments and diplomats engaged in the talks expected, and what actually happened, particularly after the North’s nuclear tests. It will trace these interpretations through the nuclear tests and will test their validity. The analysis will speak for itself and will not require an advocate of the kind that a partisan approach demands. It will have certain implications for policy which have been outlined in the conclusion. It will identify certain pertinent lessons for negotiation that should become clear as the text proceeds. The approach adopted here may not be welcomed by those who are emotionally tied to a particular view, or who defend their government’s record during the negotiations, or whose views are shaped by their national position. They may object that policy is more important than analysis, and that it is not enough to understand a difficult situation but to know how to extricate ourselves from it. This author’s response is that, one way or another, the foundation for effective policy has to be sound and competent analysis, without which policy becomes directionless and hostage to the populism of the day. In the age of the internet and the personal blog, populism increasingly infects academic discourse, and judgment is made bewildered by the shifting sands of ill informed opinion beneath it. Academic works on this contentious subject often take their cue from dip-

lomatic self-images, or how governments like to portray their national position. This is evident from the focus of these academic works and, even more important, in what they avoid. American publications are strongly influenced by the expectation of a global partnership with China that would deal with a broad range of issues, security as well as economic. They focus on China’s role as mediator in the talks and tend to depict China as a supporter of US aims. They gloss over China’s close support for the North Korean regime and the extent to which that support prevented the realization of America’s aims. In South Korea supporters of the “peace regime” approach avoid mention of the North’s provocations and see them as minor hiccups on the path to reconciliation. They do not examine the extent to which the peace regime vision triggers those provocations from the North and exacerbates the dilemmas that the North faces in dealing with the South. One way or another, the intention of this analysis is to examine all these issues, those that are avoided as well, for the task of laying the foundation for effective policy.