ABSTRACT

How are negotiation outcomes explained? Why is it that powerful parties cannot always get their way in negotiations? A commonly accepted idea of negotiations is that the strongest party wins. Nonetheless, power as defined in terms of the usual indicators of national power may not always result in a capacity to prevail in negotiations for various reasons. In multilateral negotiations, parties come together with various objectives, not all in agreement with the stronger party; some will be opposed while others will swing from one side to another. With a sufficient number of parties involved each adopting different functions, balancing and bargaining become necessary, and it becomes much more difficult for stronger parties to impose their will on the proceedings. Power alone may not prevail in this situation and the way the negotiations are conducted will very often impact on the final result, and in some cases may even decide the outcome. The interaction that develops between the parties shapes the pattern of negotiations, influences expectations, modifies bargaining positions, and eventually leads to an outcome. The result can be a considerable departure from what the stronger party had intended, and its negotiating position may be weakened and undermined as a result. If the US comes into negotiations with a number of small states or allies that are dependent upon it we can generally foresee how the negotiations will develop, and we may predict the outcome. But if the US enters into negotiations with a mixed group of powerful states such as China and Russia as well as allies, the outcome of the negotiations becomes uncertain and is very much dependent on the process, how the negotiations are structured and how they are conducted. Interaction within negotiations is the key concept of this study

Power is a slippery concept. National power can be quantified according to economic and military indicators. It is not an inherent quality or element but is a relational concept based on an ability to bring about a desired outcome.

Power has been defined in various ways as the ability to get results, or to achieve objectives, or to ensure outcomes.1 Power may be understood in terms of an ability to have others endorse and accept one’s viewpoint, to draw up and control the agenda in negotiations, and to have the outcome accepted. It is relational because it very much depends upon the perceptions of others, their willingness to cooperate with intentions, or their inability or reluctance to oppose them. Power may entail the use of force, which is direct physical pressure, or influence being a derivative form of power which is suggestive of power as the capacity to persuade others to cooperate. What counts is the ability to get one’s way which may not correspond to power rankings in international affairs. When a strong power, that is, one that is rated highly according to the indicators of national power, is unable to prevail in negotiations for whatever reason we have a definitional problem. We can argue that the strong power becomes a weaker, or is unable to apply its power during negotiations, or it is hamstrung by all kinds of constraints and limitations. This is telling us, however, that the ability to get one’s way in negotiations is something else and not automatically assured by national power. A more convenient way of dealing with this problem is to separate national power from negotiating strength, which is evident when a strong power is unable to apply its power during the course of negotiations. What is important for this study is the format of negotiations, the parties involved, the particular functions they adopt and the way the negotiations are conducted. Negotiation is a process according to which conflicting positions are com-

bined to form a common decision, when parties stipulate the terms of their cooperation and give priority to common over conflicting interests.2 Negotiation theory examines the format and conduct of negotiations or what Zartman calls structure to explain why power does not always determine outcome.3 Structure is defined in terms of the factors that influence the process of interaction such as the number of the parties to the negotiations, their assessment of the value of potential outcomes, and tactical possibilities.4

Negotiation theory identifies the roles of the parties and the positions they adopt, the differences between public positions and their bottom line positions, the outcome they expect and press for, their relations with each other, the negotiating coalitions they may form, the tactics they will adopt to reach their objective, and their commitment to the final result. An analysis of the structure of negotiations will help us to understand that new dynamics are created between the parties when they sit down to discuss a particular issue, which would influence the final outcome. Not every structure will shape the outcome of negotiations and in many cases the positions are clear and the results are largely predetermined. The US may assume a leadership position in negotiations when it is supported by smaller powers dependent upon its resources or diplomatic leverage. As leader and framer of the consensus, the US role may be accepted and uncontested for the most part, and it will act to coordinate the views of others in a largely predetermined outcome where the major issues have been defined by it in advance. In complex multilateral negotiations

where issues are contentious, and where parties are divided in their expectations, the outcome becomes much more uncertain and may even work against the stronger party.