ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the debate between Aristotelians and Kantians about the role of reason and emotion in virtuous motivation. It considers their reasons for rejecting the sentimentalist view, and concludes with a discussion of a consequentialist view of the moral relevance of motivation. According to Aristotle, the desires of a virtuous person are in harmony with his reason: he doesn't have to struggle against contrary inclinations or feelings. Rosalind Hursthouse argues that it is a mistake to interpret Kant and Aristotle as holding opposite views about the role of inclination. The most important point to take from Hursthouse's discussion so far is that Kant and Aristotle agree about two things: the emotions, conceived merely as natural inclinations, are unreliable guides to acting well and virtuous person acts from reason rather than merely from inclination or passion. Kantians claim that being well-motivated involves acting from reason and not from desire or inclination.
