ABSTRACT
In this chapter the subjective games of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax are analyzed for the periods extending from the post-Munich period to the post-Polish period. The fit between the predictions of their subjective games and British interactions with Germany is assessed for each period. The cognitive, decision-making, and communication processes by Chamberlain and the British cabinet are analyzed as well to reveal the complexity in Chamberlain’s thought processes during cabinet meetings and the dynamics of the interactions between Chamberlain and his colleagues during the Polish crisis. In particular, differences in the cognitive complexity of the prime minister during different decision-making episodes of the British cabinet are compared within the Polish crisis and for the British government in the intergovernmental policy arena across the Sudeten and Polish crises. Finally, differences in the belief systems of Chamberlain and Halifax are examined over time to assess their learning patterns between 1937 and 1939.
